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ABSTRACT Many scholarly analyses of small economies over the past two decades have been
premised on the implicit understanding that a state’s small population size, compounded by such
factors as islandness and remoteness from markets, is to blame for an inherent and unavoidable
economic vulnerability. The article critiques the core features of this approach, and proposes in
turn to discuss and proﬁle the development trajectories of small economies from the vantage point
of the strategic ﬂexibility used by small states (at multiple levels as individuals, household units,
corporate entities and complete jurisdictions) in seeking to exploit opportunities and maximize
economic gains in a turbulent and dynamic external environment with which they must engage.
Keeping alive a portfolio of skills and revenue streams enables these actors to migrate inter-
sectorally as well as trans-nationally.
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ﬂexibility, vulnerability
Introduction: Vulnerability or Strategic Flexibility?
It is common to see small states,1 and in particular small island states, described as
‘vulnerable’, from which a case is often mounted for granting especially favourable
concessions to small island developing states (SIDS). In this paper, we argue that this
conceptual approach to the analysis of small states, however useful it may be in
terms of diplomatic leverage, is not the right place to start if one is seeking an
analytical understanding of how small states survive, develop, and exploit the
opportunities and threats that face them in the global order.
The vulnerability paradigm which we critique is a version of structural
determinism which asserts that from small size ﬂows weakness, and from weakness
ﬂows inability to manage eﬀectively the challenges one faces, and from this
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incapacity follows some sense of entitlement as well as of an obligation upon the
international community to provide unusually generous development and diplomatic
assistance in response to the ‘special needs’ of small states (Briguglio, 1995; Charles
et al., 1997; Commonwealth Secretariat, no date; Commonwealth Consultative
Group 1985; Crowards and Coulter 1998, 1999; Streeten, 1993; United Nations
Committee on Development Policy, 2005).
The strategic ﬂexibility paradigm, set out here as an alternative approach, is
grounded in empirical observation: many small states not only survive but thrive in
the modern global order. Briguglio’s (1995) ‘vulnerability index’ correlates
positively, not negatively, with GDP per capita (Armstrong et al., 1998). The
survival into the modern era of a large number of successful small states and sub-
national jurisdictions is evidence, we suggest, not of weakness but of underlying
elements of strength that are inherent in small, often island, societies.
Many of the statistical measures paraded before international agencies as signs of
vulnerability and special needs are in fact the outcomes of purposive and rational
strategic behaviour by active agents (both individuals and collectivities) operating in
microstate environments. Successful small countries actively increase their trade
ratios, narrow their economic diversiﬁcation, increase their reliance on ﬁnancial
transfers from larger metropolitan powers, explore alternatives to industrialization,
and embark on high-volatility activities while making due provision to retain
windfall gains to oﬀset losses.
Statistical indices made up of weighted averages of these indicators do not serve as
proof of vulnerability; rather, they presume it (e.g. Charles et al., 1997, p. 13).
Circularity is pervasive. The ‘economic vulnerability index’ used by the United
Nations Committee on Development Policy (2005) to evaluate whether small states
should be graduated from least-developed status is constructed from seven
indicators, one of which is population size: to be small is to be vulnerable. The
Commonwealth Secretariat’s ‘‘Composite Vulnerability Index’’ contains three
indicators chosen from a candidate list of 29 on the entirely ad hoc basis that they
give the best statistical prediction of output volatility, which was presumed to
equate to ‘vulnerability’, notwithstanding that the result was to rank Singapore
among the ten ‘most vulnerable’ countries in the Commonwealth (Atkins et al.,
2000).
To avoid misunderstanding, we are not saying that small states are not
challenged by their size and location. Every country is, to some extent. Our point is
that strategically intelligent evolutionary responses to the particular challenges of
smallness, islandness, remoteness, higher propensity to hurricanes, and so on, have
as their outcomes the statistically measured indicators used in ‘vulnerability index’
exercises. Hyper-specialization, openness, reliance upon external sources of ﬁnance,
living with cycles of volatility, all go with the territory and do not in themselves
carry any necessary connotation of weakness, fragility, or vulnerability. They are
evidence of ‘‘the ability of the receiving agents to respond to risk’’ (Charles et al.,
1997, p. 14). Having produced a vulnerability index, Briguglio (1995, p. 1624)
recommended that appropriate policies for SIDS should comprise ‘‘niche-ﬁlling
export strategy’’ and ‘‘ﬂexible specialization’’; both of these, if pursued success-
fully, would cause ‘vulnerability’ (as measured by the index) to rise, rather than
to fall.
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Of Finches, Frogs and Small States
In The Beak of the Finch, Jonathan Weiner writes about the important contributions
to evolutionary science that have been made possible, and continue to be made, from
meticulous and sustained observations of the changing size and shape of the beaks of
ﬁnches that live on the island of Daphne Major, in the Gala´pagos archipelago. This
island is small enough to have allowed intrepid researchers, led by Peter and
Rosemary Grant, to keep close track of the inter-generational patterns and trends of
all the ﬁnches on this island for various decades—an almost perfect controlled
experiment. When correlated with such environmental variables as frequency and
quantity of rain, drought, and seed supply, the picture which emerges is one that
shows evolution in action, and one where the beak of the ﬁnch is the protagonist,
given its crucial role in the survival of the birds. Hybridization is common. The mean
size and shape of the beak of ﬁnches on Daphne Major changes inter-generationally,
in response to climatic conditions, even if by a few millimetres, which can and does
spell the diﬀerence between life and death (Weiner, 1994).
Writing a decade earlier, Peter Katzenstein (1985) reported on the success of the
small European states in his book Small States in World Markets. The relatively
small size of such European states as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland—although
much larger than any of the world’s microstates—makes it impossible even for them
to set prices or to determine international trade regimens; they are thus obliged to
nimbly ride the waves that would otherwise destroy them. They are characterized by
rapid policy deployments, and a resolve in confronting the outside world that cuts
across political party lines—features that larger jurisdictions would be hard put to
copy.2 Katzenstein argues that the small European state has been forced to develop
patterns of active, ﬂexible, societally orchestrated adjustment as a result of
international market exposure and the strategic disadvantages of small size in
negotiating international terms of trade. Small European countries are typically
politically integrated and highly developed welfare states where social embeddedness
of the economy is promoted through negotiation, rather than polarization. This
embedding takes the form of active state intervention, ranging from a large public
sector and incomes policies to generous welfare expenditure. A spirit of political
cooperation and a shared vision of international economic relations allow eﬃcient
adaptation to both unforeseen exogenous developments and the threats of an
inherently turbulent and unpredictable international environment (Katzenstein,
1985; also Midttun, Gautesen and Gjolberg, 2006).
Katzenstein concludes his 1985 work, as well as his 2003 rejoinder, with an
‘‘Aesopian fable’’, after the famous storyteller from Classical Greece, which is worth
reproducing in full:
The adjustment strategy of the small European states is summed up by the story
of the snake, the frog and the owl. Fearful of being devoured by the snake, the
frog asks the owl how he [sic] might survive. The owl’s response is brief and
cryptic. Learn how to ﬂy. None of the small European states have to soar like
the eagle. What they have learned to cultivate is an amazing capacity to jump.
Although they appear to land on their stomachs, in fact they always land on
their feet and retain the ability to jump again and again in diﬀerent directions,
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correcting their course as they go along. In a world of great uncertainty and
high-risk choices, this is an intelligent response. Frogs can escape snakes, and
the small corporatist states can continue to prosper: not because they have
found a solution to the problem of change but because they have found a way to
live with change. (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 211; 2003, p. 30)
Flexible Adjustment Rules
What ﬁnches, frogs and small states have in common is ﬂexible, strategic
responsiveness to threats and opportunities in their changing environments. In
situations where contextual features are strong and where local actors have no
chance of changing these features, then these actors adapt in response to change.
Individual members of the species or group may fail in this task; but the survival of
the collective depends on the capacity for ﬂexible adjustment. Whether the challenges
are climatic conditions (as in the case of the ﬁnches on Daphne Major), international
markets (as in European small states), or hungry snakes (as in the case of frogs), the
way forward is to develop and deploy rapid response capabilities. As clear evidence
of success, we note that ﬁnches, frogs and small states continue to exist. They are not
extinct. The key distinction between ﬁnches and small states is that the changes
undergone by the bird in its beak are longer-term and inter-generational; small states
are much more supple and ﬂexible, since they are in principle expected to
accommodate to change practically all the time.3
A similar impression of strategic capability comes across when we zoom in and
look critically at individuals who are citizens of small, often island, jurisdictions. In
their case, longitudinal studies demonstrate an agile and entrepreneurial respon-
siveness to shifting opportunities in diﬀerent stages of their lives. Theirs is a
deployment of ‘economies of scope’, of polyvalency, or of ‘occupational multi-
plicity’—terms that have emerged following research in Caribbean economies such
as that by Lambros Comitas (1963) and Richard Frucht (1967). Being ‘‘a Jack, or
Jill, of many trades’’ (Bennell and Oxenham, 1983) may not secure the blessing of
international observers bred in a context where rigid specialization and core focus is
the mantra. (‘‘Learn how to ﬂy’’, the owl had said to the frog.) But: ‘‘in small
countries, the best may sometimes be deﬁned in terms of ﬂexibility and breadth,
rather than depth’’ (Brock, 1988, p. 306).
Take occupational multiplicity. The pursuit of several occupations, either
simultaneously or successively, and in more than one geographical location, is a
natural survival strategy for individuals or households who inhabit areas where
employment or revenue opportunities are limited, and more so where they are
seasonal or precarious (Frucht, 1967, p. 296; Trouillot, 1988, p. 32). These would
typically involve both waged and non-waged labour, petty commodity production,
subsistence ﬁshing or farming and home-working. It is a natural defence mechanism,
a ‘‘security-centred survival algorithm’’ (Brookﬁeld, 1975, pp. 56–57) and a lucrative
tactic in the face of uncertainty; more so if the small economy’s experience is
typically ‘‘hypothermic’’ (Baldacchino, 2000), experiencing a sequence of stop-go,
boom-and-bust, feast-and-famine situations (Looney, 1989, p. 76; Blackman, 1991,
p. 1; Pahl, 1984, pp. 46–48; Price, 1988, p. 1; Fergus, 1991, p. 570). By way of
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example, the migration history of the Caribbean Basin supports Carnegie’s (1987)
thesis that West Indians live by a philosophy of ‘‘strategic ﬂexibility’’ that allows
them to take on whatever economic mobility opportunities may become available
(e.g. Foner, 2001; Spickard, Rondillo and Hippolite Wright, 2002).
The life-histories of the inhabitants of small jurisdictions, where meticulously
documented, reveal a complex juggling of the pros and cons of home and away.
Consider, for example, Isaac Caines, from the Caribbean island of St Kitts (proﬁled
in Richardson, 1983, pp. 54–55); Kawagl, from the Melanesian South Paciﬁc
(proﬁled in Brookﬁeld, 1972, pp. 167–168); and Marshy, a street vendor from
Kingston, Jamaica (proﬁled in Wardle, 2002). Each of the three has a broad skill-set,
yet would focus on a particular set of tasks at any point in time. Moreover, when
looked at longitudinally, each of these individuals demonstrates an uncanny skill
repertoire in the economies and temporalities of scope (as against scale), which
include entrepreneurship, ﬂexible specialization, public sector employment, and
stints abroad. ‘‘Flexible specialisation’’ (e.g. Poon, 1990) and ‘‘multi-functionality’’
(e.g. Farrugia and Attard, 1989) are the key attributes of small, island economies as
much as of their constituent citizens, households and ﬁrms (Baldacchino and Bray,
2001; Bertram and Poirine, 2007, p. 368; Schmitz, 1989; Sultana, 2006, pp. 26–27).
Consider this account by Carnegie (1982, p. 12):
Even people with very secure jobs often have part-time occupations or get
training in other trades to develop other marketable skills. One friend in
St Lucia who has been with a particular public service department for about 14
years, and held a middle level position in the department, also had a steady
extra income from furniture upholstering. During the time that I knew him, he
was also taking an accredited course in welding, and wanted to learn
refrigerator repairs as well. He was also looking for opportunities to go abroad
to study agronomy . . . It is commonplace to have several sources of income and
systematically to maintain each one, even if some may bring in very little cash.
Thus, individuals, households or business units strategically spread their risks, not
in spite, but because of the small economy’s overall macro-dependence on one or a
few, exogenous sources of income. A synchronic ‘snapshot’ might suggest a
precariously specialized economy; however, a diachronic ‘video’ reveals a dynamic
and diversiﬁed portfolio.
Mull over the economic yo-yoing of the Caribbean island state of St Lucia, set up
as a plantation economy following European discovery. Sugar drove the plantation
economy for many decades but was eclipsed by coal (1880s–1930s), which was in
turn overtaken by bananas during the 1960s; tourism then surpassed the banana
‘green gold’ in revenue in 1993 (e.g. Ellis, 2005). With each (often dramatic) ebb of a
speciﬁc leading sector and the emergence of another, the socio-economy suﬀers
painful dislocation: unemployment and relative poverty set in amongst the losers
who are bound to ﬁght against the change of fortune but who—unless the state
succumbs to their protectionist demands—are likely to eventually adapt or negotiate
an honourable exit strategy: to draw on social or state supports; switch to what is
perceived as the next winning horse; and, as is also typical amongst small islanders,
opt for exi(s)le (Bongie, 1998) or a stint overseas.
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Critiquing the ‘Vulnerability Paradigm’
Our ‘strategic ﬂexibility thesis’, as a conceptual point of departure for the analysis of
small economies, contrasts sharply with the more popular ‘vulnerability approach’
that has dominated much recent conventional wisdom (e.g. Briguglio, 1995; Streeten,
1993). The vulnerability paradigm has followed from downbeat views about the
presumed inherent non-viability of small states (e.g. Harden, 1985; Plischke, 1977).
The presumption that constraints of small size and geographical separateness
render small economies particularly economically ‘vulnerable’ is both conceptually
and empirically unsatisfactory. Conceptually, there are advantages as well as
disadvantages to being small and isolated. Empirically, many small economies
appear on balance quite robust in a globalizing world. Briguglio’s ‘vulnerability
index’ is positively, not negatively, related to per capita income: the more
‘vulnerable’ the economy, the higher its per capita income (Armstrong and Read,
2005). Armstrong et al. (1998, p. 644), and Easterly and Kraay (2000, p. 2015) agree
that small (mainly island) jurisdictions consistently tend to perform economically
better than larger (mainly continental) states. Proponents of the vulnerability
hypothesis have implicitly conceded the point by introducing a countervailing
concept of ‘‘resilience’’, placed in a contradictory dialectical relationship to
vulnerability to produce indeterminacy of outcomes (Briguglio et al., 2005).
The problem with the ‘vulnerability’ approach is that it was from the outset an a
priori top-down construction, departing from the supposition that isolation,
exposure and small size must imply economic diﬃculties greater than those faced
by larger economies. The relatively strong ex post economic performance of small
economies, however, has always suggested that vulnerability has been overplayed.
Briguglio et al. call this the ‘‘Singapore Paradox’’: ‘‘the seeming contradiction that a
country can be highly vulnerable and yet attain high levels of GDP per capita’’
(2005, p. 27). But that it is a paradox at all is far from obvious. The vulnerability-
versus-resilience paradigm relies heavily on the suggestion that vulnerability is
exogenously imposed, whereas resilience is endogenously created as a response. A
review of the components of the two indices, however, reveals that exogenous and
endogenous elements are found on both sides. The image of vulnerability is no doubt
seen as instrumentally useful in the rhetoric of political lobbying and aid
justiﬁcation—although whether this approach has actually delivered tangible results
is another matter altogether—but it lacks solid roots in economic reality.
What Briguglio and Streeten might call ‘‘vulnerability’’, therefore, is better
characterized as exposure to incentives to adapt. Where adaptation capability is
strong, vulnerability calls forth its opposite and thereby strengthens, rather than
weakens, small economies.
Briguglio et al. are, however, clearly on target with their new focus on strategic
behaviour by both individual economic agents and policymaking elites in the small-
island setting.
The strategic ﬂexibility model departs from the non-viability–vulnerability–
resilience cluster in a number of interrelated ways. Firstly, it starts from a real-life,
inductive, ‘bottom up’ examination of actual behaviour patterns among small states
and their citizens; the alternative cluster tends to be prescriptive and deductive,
seeking to explain reality ‘top down’. Secondly, the strategic ﬂexibility approach
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tends to be more optimistic and hopeful about the innate qualities of small
economies and of the individuals and ﬁrms that they comprise; for the non-viability–
vulnerability–resilience paradigm, the tone is more guarded, pessimistic, even
fatalistic, because the constraints and limitations are deemed to constitute a
structural given. Thirdly, the strategic ﬂexibility thesis treats the economic structure
of small economies as a matter of proactive behavioural adaptation within the
parameters of smallness, isolation and history, rather than of passive response to
exogenously set, world market prices (Bertram and Poirine, 2007). Fourthly, ‘small
states’ may still have considerable internal and external capacity: the Scandinavian
countries are excellent examples, with their track record of UN military deployment
and involvement in international diplomacy (Thorallsson, 2006, pp. 24–25). As
Warrington (1998, p. 105) shrewdly remarks, a small state’s ‘‘governing wits’’ may
well compensate handsomely for any disadvantages that may, legitimately or
otherwise, be associated with its small size.
To be fair, small size, combined with islandness and peripherality, can be argued
to render small economies particularly exposed to external shocks (e.g. Briguglio,
1995; Streeten, 1993); but vulnerability in the usual sense of the term applies most
clearly in the environmental realm, in cases of natural disasters: earthquakes, ﬂoods,
volcanic eruptions, hurricanes or tsunamis. There is no well-established empirical
basis for claiming economic vulnerability. Paradoxically, the often-cited openness to
international trade (one of the key components of the vulnerability index), with its
associated volatility, is a source of strength rather than weakness for small
economies, obliging them to be internationally competitive on open markets and
preventing them from collapsing into anarchy or protectionism on economic terms
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Armstrong and Read, 2004, pp. 214, 217–218).
Similarly, a ‘‘heavy dependence’’ on transfers from abroad (increasingly
remittances, as in the case of Samoa or Tonga, rather than aid) is often perceived
as evidence of vulnerability (e.g. Atkins, Mazzi and Easter, 2000, p. 31), but can
equally be an indication of success in luring funds, capital and ‘rents’ from other
economies (Kakazu, 1994) and establishing ﬂourishing diasporas. Researchers such
as Armstrong and Read (1998, p. 13) have argued that many states have managed to
compensate eﬀectively for their small size by ‘‘optimal endogenous policy
formulation and implementation’’ and via a successful ‘‘international political
economy’’. Many small jurisdictions have deployed their regulatory powers to
facilitate favourable trans-border activity: enacting laws and regulations intended
and aimed exclusively at individuals and institutions located beyond their borders
(Conrad, 1973, p. 633, our emphasis).
These arguments can be classiﬁed schematically as Table 1 below.
Reviewing Pertinent Statistics
Thus, on balance, small economies appear quite robust in a globalizing world. Take
the annual economic review of Commonwealth small states, which compares vital
statistics of the 35 Commonwealth jurisdictions with similar values for 28 other
countries, all collated from World Bank data. In terms of GDP per capita, Gambia,
Guyana, Lesotho and Sierra Leone are the only Commonwealth small states
considered to be low-income economies. All but one is located in Africa, the main
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geographic location of the world’s poorest and least developed states. At the other
end of the scale, the six Commonwealth small states that are high-income economies
are all either islands in toto, or on islands: the Bahamas, Brunei, Cyprus, Malta, New
Zealand and Singapore (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, Table 4). The poorest
economies have the largest contributions by agriculture to overall GDP, typically,
20–60%, whereas the richest small economies have no agricultural sector
worth noting (Singapore¼ 0%; Malta and Bahamas¼ 3%; Brunei¼ 5%;
New Zealand¼ 5%; Cyprus¼ 7%, as at 2003) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005,
Table 5).4 It has been argued that a strong agricultural lobby tends to brake an
economy from industrialization and economic diversiﬁcation. Streeten (1993, p. 199)
calls the agricultural lobby a ‘‘slowcoach’’ to development. To the extent that this is
correct, the absence of a rural hinterland is potentially good news for development.5
Consider next the grouping of small developing states by region and by levels of
human development (as measured by the UNDP using 2000 data), including
Table 1. The ‘strategic ﬂexibility’ versus ‘vulnerability’ approach to the performance of
small economies: the paradigms compared, issue by issue
Issue Strategic ﬂexibility approach Vulnerability approach
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indicators such as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, gross primary secondary
and tertiary enrolment, and GDP per capita at purchasing power parity. Ten small
economies—Barbados, Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei, Bahrain, Malta,
Cyprus, Bhutan, Qatar and Estonia—have the highest human development levels. At
the other end, there are just three small economies with low levels of human
development: Djibouti, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau (Liou and Ding, 2002).
Out of the World Bank’s list of 44, high-income, non-OECD countries, all but one
(Saudi Arabia) are small economies (e.g. Davies et al., 2006, Appendix V).6 Out of
the large number of Caribbean island states and sub-national island jurisdictions, the
World Bank only considers Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and St Vincent
and the Grenadines as ‘‘lower middle income economies’’, while Haı¨ti is the only
Caribbean nation to appear as a ‘‘lower income economy’’. It is pertinent to note
that four out of the ﬁve countries in this unenviable grouping are the largest (that is,
most heavily populated) economies in the region. The exception, St Vincent and the
Grenadines, is still reeling from the uncertainty surrounding the future of bananas,
its main export crop, and painfully making the switch to other economic activities,
particularly tourism and construction (Caribbean Development Bank, 2005).
It may come as a surprise that a listing of the 10 richest countries of the world in
terms of GDP per capita according to the World Bank would feature only two ‘large
states’: Japan and the USA. The other eight have populations of less than 10 million
each, and three have populations of less than one million. Liechtenstein holds the top
spot, followed by Luxembourg (e.g. www.quia.com/rd/6913.html). It appears much
more pertinent to contemplate the challenges of ‘giantism’ (e.g. Lewis, 1991, on
India) and the anomalous success of large countries like the US (e.g. The Economist,
2003), than to assume that small jurisdictions are inherently disadvantaged.
The above discussion is predicated on the suitability of GDP per capita (typically
based on purchasing power parity) as the choice indicator of comparison. However,
and in spite of its universal availability, the statistic has its limitations (for example,
it emphasizes a territorial, rather than national, approach). Small economies tend to
be badly served by GDP-based analysis, which is a source of both under-evaluations
and over-evaluations. Added transport costs (a consequence of islandness and
remoteness) and public aid (designed to oﬀset the consequences of islandness and
remoteness) are both considered as ‘wealth’ produced in the region and thus increase
GDP. On the other hand, extensive social networking, occupational multiplicity, rich
levels of bridging and bonding ‘social capital’ and voluntarism mean that the citizens
of various small jurisdictions perform ‘activities’ that either do not feature in oﬃcial
value added, or else mitigate (via preventive measures) what would otherwise be
registered as ‘expenditure’ (such as family-based child or elderly care). Some such
activities may be remunerated; others may be compensated in kind; others still may
be for personal use (e.g. Baldacchino, 2005a).
Various other activities are designed to exploit the resources of the sprawling
public sector: working the system and the state for economic gain is a viable
intrapreneurial strategy in small polities, because decision-makers are known and
accessible, and decision-making is a transparent process (Lowenthal, 1987, p. 43;
Schahczenski, 1992, p. 41).
Finally, but just as importantly, a stock of overseas-resident migrants sustains a
ﬂow of remittance transfers that can constitute a signiﬁcant, legitimate and regular
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provision of foreign exchange (Prasad, 2004, pp. 51–53). Remittance providers can
be depended upon for the provision of cash and/or gifts in kind for a limited time
period, after which they may be replaced or refreshed with new emigrants who would
kick-start the process once more, in a cycle that represents a shrewd income-
maximization strategy by a household that functions as a fully ﬂedged ‘‘transna-
tional corporation of kin’’ (Marcus, 1981). The incentive to perform such tasks
increases with higher levels of taxation (typical of small island states with narrow tax
bases) since all these activities typically escape the conventional tax net. In sum, then,
the citizens of small economies tend to have better living standards than their GDP
ﬁgures suggest.
The existence, and ongoing reproduction via migration, of large diasporas of small
state citizens carries the implication that migrants experience higher levels of real
income than home residents. Recent IMF work on the concept of ‘‘Gross Migration-
Adjusted Product’’ (GMP) (Ueda, 2002; Cardarelli and Ueda, 2004) suggests that
the territorially restricted frame of reference of conventional national-income
accounting fails to capture much of the actual economic growth experience of
internationally mobile populations of the sort typiﬁed by small economies.
Even though the per capita GDP of small states is much higher on average than
that of other less developed countries, the former have received as much as almost
nine times as much aid per capita on average when compared to other less developed
states: US$87 as against US$10. Moreover, sub-national or non-sovereign island
jurisdictions receive 36 times more bilateral aid than comparable independent island
states: US$3099 per capita (Poirine, 1999, p. 843, Table 1). Meanwhile, development
aid is fast being outstripped by migrant worker remittances, now the largest single
category of international ﬁnancial ﬂows to small states (Bertram and Poirine, 2007,
pp. 348–353).
Towards a Taxonomy of the Structures of Small Economies
In a number of small jurisdictions, cash incomes are derived to a large extent from
migrant remittances and public sector employment, the latter supported by
international aid ﬂows. This condition crowds out economic activity in the
conventionally ‘productive’ private sector. A high propensity to migrate represents
a rational development option (in spite of its prima facie unorthodoxy) not merely
for the individual migrants, their households and their businesses, but also for the
economy as a whole. The ‘MIRAB’ structure,7 originally applied to ﬁve small Paciﬁc
territories,8 can be extended to other small jurisdictions; Haiti is the single most
obvious contemporary MIRAB state in the Caribbean, along with Dominica.
But MIRAB is only one of the patterns of the kaleidoscope (Bertram, 2006, p. 11).
Especially in the Caribbean, international tourism plays a considerable role, to such
an extent, that apart from public sector employment, many small economies are
driven by the tourism industry. McElroy (2006; also Oberst and McElroy, 2007) calls
these Small Island Tourism Economies (SITEs), and he argues that they constitute a
‘‘special island development alternative’’ to MIRAB. Although the costs as well as
beneﬁts of tourism have long been well recognized (e.g. Bryden, 1973), McElroy
argues that SITEs tend towards a distinctive proﬁle: they are inclined to be more
aﬄuent, and their citizens enjoy higher mobility, higher life expectancy, higher
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literacy, lower fertility and lower infant mortality rates. The world’s most tourism
penetrated economies are concentrated in the Caribbean; they are all small and
islanded, and they tend to be sub-national island jurisdictions.9 The Caribbean
tourism product has been developed in the context of international competition and
free trade, beneﬁts from a distinctive regional brand, and boasts two locally owned
ﬂagship hospitality multinationals in Sandals (www.sandals.com/) and Superclubs
(www.superclubs.com/).
Beyond tourism, remittances and aid, there are a raft of other ‘economic
capacities’ that small economies can deploy, given good governance, the creative use
of jurisdiction as a resource, durable ties to a larger political host, and some measure
of good luck: either singly or in combination, and often in association with tourism
(Baldacchino and Milne, 2006). These capacities can include: oﬀshore banking and
related ﬁnancial services; niche-targeted, well branded manufactures; cultural and
natural heritage assets; air and sea transportation; citizenship, residency and work
permits; and paradiplomacy. Activities such as these do not become growth poles on
their own: they are nurtured and often initiated by active strategic behaviour on the
part of the jurisdictional elite. Current exemplars of such successful small economies
would include the states of Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and the Seychelles; and the
Sub-National Island Jurisdictions (SNIJs) of A˚land, Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman and
the Falkland Islands. The acronym for such economies would spell PROFIT10
(Baldacchino, 2006, p. 54).
Baldacchino (2006) argues that PROFIT economies diﬀer from their MIRAB
cousins in their more explicit collective focus on negotiation and protection of their
chosen niches: a shrewd immigration and cyclical migration policy; tough external
negotiations concerning the use of local mineral, natural, political and other
imaginative but exploitable resources; securing and controlling viable means of
transportation; and luring foreign direct investment via preferential tax regimes.
SITE economies intersect clearly with both MIRAB and PROFIT economies;
while MIRAB and PROFIT economies have fewer intersections (see Figure 1).
The broader the clutch of capacities successfully deployed, the less the respective
dependence on any particular economic sub-sector; but diversiﬁcation in very small
scale settings is not necessarily a good thing, and can weaken the strategic focus on
the growth pole. Bertram and Poirine (2007, pp. 329–330) comment thus:
Below a size threshold somewhere around the 1-million population mark,
economies (including landlocked ones such as the Vatican as well as islands)
tend to exhibit extreme specialisation into one or two globally-linked leading
sectors which, once selected, determine the character of the economy as a whole.
The selection process obeys not so much the orthodox theory of comparative
advantage (in which an economy responds in passive fashion to exogenous
relative-price signals) as a strategic game-theoretic process of self-selective
hyper-specialisation, here labeled ‘speciation’ . . . ‘Speciation’ refers to the sort of
specialisation in which an entire community takes advantage of a niche of
evolutionary opportunity by adopting a particular economic ‘personality’ with
its own distinctive set of institutions, policy imperatives, and mutual under-
standings amongst the participating population. Economic speciation involves a
conscious or quasi-conscious collective decision by the [small state] community
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to embrace the economic phenomenon of crowding-out, with ‘Dutch Disease’
treated as an evolutionary opportunity rather than a threat. (Matsen and
Torvik, 2005)
Given the openness of small economies to events beyond their control, and the
likely high impact of any such events on the domestic economy, one should not be
surprised to ﬁnd evidence of dynamism: particular economies mutate as their
environments shift. When a longitudinal perspective is adopted, the economies of
small states tend to move in and out of a speciﬁc cluster. An increase or decrease in
tourism; more or less aid provision; the success or failure of a key private industry or
sub-sector (like ﬁsheries or banking), can oblige a small economy to move (often
quite swiftly) out of one cluster and into another. This dynamic ﬂexibility and ‘‘rapid
response capability’’ (Bertram and Poirine, 2007, p. 333) is a strategic (although it
could also be a default) response to opportunity, especially necessary in situations
where there is hyper-specialization of economic activity at a national level. East
Timor, Nauru and the Comoros have increasingly taken on the character of MIRAB
states in recent years; the Cayman Islands have moved away from being a MIRAB
classic to a PROFIT/SITE success story; Sa˜o Tome´ y Principe is slated to move from
MIRAB to PROFIT as it transits to an oil-exporting economy.
Figure 1. The structures of small economies: a threefold taxonomy (with overlaps).
Sources: Adapted from Bertram (2006) and Bertram and Poirine (2007).
152 G. Baldacchino and G. Bertram
To allow space in the story for believers in the one-dimensional conventional
development paradigm, nurturing successful indigenously owned, small-scale,
export-oriented manufacturing ﬁrms in small economies may be diﬃcult but is not
impossible: the typically largest indigenous manufacturing ﬁrm in many small
economies is a brewery, serving a mainly local market. Manufacturing products
which beneﬁt from locally available, raw material input can be viable business
ventures, especially if there is: a strong branding of the product with the respective
island and its associated characteristics; free-riding on tourism; and limited local ﬁrm
rivalry (Baldacchino, 2005b; Fairbairn, 1988; Punnett and Morrison, 2006). There
are also a few examples of remarkable success in export-oriented manufacturing on
the back of jurisdiction-speciﬁc institutional opportunities: export-processing zones
in Mauritius (Subramaniam and Roy, 2001), garment manufacturing for the US
market in the Northern Marianas, where cheap Asian migrant workers can be
recruited outside the US visa border but the production occurs inside the US
customs frontier (Bertram and Poirine, 2007, pp. 333–334).
Finally, in the information and communication technology sector, ﬁrms from
small states can compete in export markets without most of the handicaps associated
with islandness and remoteness, developing products or services that are light or
which, like software, have no tangible weight or volume and which can be procured
and serviced electronically. In any case, island entrepreneurs can develop and
nurture ‘extra-island’ contacts and markets to usurp the limitations of the domestic
market using, for example, diaspora links (e.g. Camara, 2006; Baldacchino and
Fairbairn, 2006). The absence of notable local market opportunities induces small
state entrepreneurs to ‘‘export or perish’’, obliging a competitive strategy from
inception (Baldacchino and Vella Bonnici, 2006).
Shopping Around for the Right Role Models
What then leads some small countries to rely on aid and/or remittances, while others
(Malta, Ireland) have even shed their status as developing countries? There is no
simple or single answer to this question, but the strategic perceptions of key
individuals can be crucial in small jurisdictions. A common theme is the quest for
useful role models, in the hope of identifying the key ingredients in proven recipes.
Historically, Singapore’s leadership held Malta as a role model in the 1960s (Lee
Kwan Yew, 2000); while Mauritius in the early 1970s held Taiwan and Puerto Rico
as its prime examples of how to succeed in reinventing itself as an export-processing
zone (Yeung Lam Ko, 1998, p. 7). Imitation has its limitations, however: it is too
easy to forget that many recipes for success are historically speciﬁc (path-dependent)
and cannot be easily replicated. Under the right particular circumstances, and the
right frame of mind, what may appear to be a liability—like ethnic diversity—may
end up proving to be an asset.
Warrington and Milne (2007) propose a typology consisting of seven patterns of
island governance, based on a critical, historical review of small island development.
Many of these patterns will be easily recognized since they have been deployed by
social scientists to describe a distinguishing feature which becomes the dominant
signature, or leitmotif, of a particular island’s existence. This typology includes the
pattern called plantation, which is associated by scholarship with the bulk of
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Caribbean small states; the ﬁef is associated with Haiti; the settlement with Iceland;
and the fortress with Malta. The typology also includes the entrepoˆt (literally, a
trading centre): ‘‘a market enjoying the fortress’s advantages of location and
centrality, but generating internally the conditions fostering its success: speciﬁcally
investment ﬁnance, entrepreneurial ﬂair as well as a legal, regulatory and dispute
resolution regime that facilitates market transactions and innovation by minimizing
cost and risk’’ (Warrington and Milne, 2007, p. 413, emphasis in original). Many
small economies have started oﬀ with the political economy of ﬁefs, fortresses,
settlements or plantations, and have charted their emancipation from this condition
by the entrepoˆt star.11
Of course, being an entrepoˆt does not change an economy’s small size and its
geography. Any small entrepoˆt economy remains prone to such contingencies as
regional wars, natural disasters, accidents, security threats, epidemics, market
shocks or technological obsolescence. Lacking a hinterland under its own control,
it cannot count on material, ﬁscal or even human resource reserves available to
larger countries.12 Unless an entrepoˆt tirelessly innovates, re-positions and re-
invents itself and enhances its competitiveness, it is always at risk of decline. The
innovative streak concerns not only product development and technological
sophistication, but extends beyond, to creative governance. This includes the
recognition of the resourcefulness of jurisdictional capacity, using the leverage that
it provides on the international stage to secure concessionary bilateral trade
agreements, build and nurture special relationships with benevolent patrons; while
making the domestic economy attractive for business, with government and public
administration supporting vigorous economic activity, quality education and
welfare schemes. Entrepoˆts tend towards conservative rather than liberal
democracy, emphasizing consensual politics and mistrusting dissent. Their
necessary openness to, and engagement with, the outside world is a shared
development paradigm across the political divide. If they attract immigrants and
their various cultures, then their outward cultural assimilation is favoured
(Warrington and Milne, 2007, passim). Mauritius exempliﬁes both the problem
and the strategy (e.g. Chernoﬀ and Warner, 2002).
Conclusion: Strategy and Context; Agency and Structure
The triple accidents of size, geography and sovereignty have endowed many small
economies with: an element of cultural cohesion; a relatively large and ubiquitous
public sector; a disproportionate presence in international aﬀairs; rich social
networks with commensurate levels of social capital; an extensive and relatively
aﬄuent diaspora; and, especially in the temperate and tropic regions of the world, a
disposition to become tourist attractions.
These characteristics can be complemented or ﬂeshed out by a range of possible
economic activities. The latter would include: geo-strategic rents; niche ‘high-end’
banking and oﬀshore ﬁnance services; niche high value-added export manufactures;
cash crops, minerals, ﬁsh and other ‘natural resource rents’ that command
competitive prices on open markets; other ‘rents’ derived via negotiation with
metropolitan powers (mainly grants and loans, but also special prices on certain
exports); high economic return migration via the international mobility of domestic
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labour and transfers via remittances or repatriated capital; and conventional rents
resulting from property sales to expatriates or returning migrants that have large
multiplier eﬀects on the local economy.13 Not all of these can be pursued at the same
time: aid and remittances, for example, tend to ‘crowd out’ other activities. But some
can: a combination of oﬀshore ﬁnance and high quality tourism stands out as the
strategy of the most successful island economies today (Bertram and Poirine, 2007,
p. 362).
The situation can be visually represented as a series of options laid out on a
spinning wheel. There is thus a range of economic options available, each
represented by a segment, whose importance will ebb and ﬂow through time, as
they become more and less important historically. Whether the small economy
corresponds to the MIRAB, SITE or PROFIT model would now be seen to largely
depend on which are the leading economic sectors (see Figure 2).
The operating context being what it is, one or more of these options may shrivel or
disappear suddenly; this is the price to be paid for economic openness. But when that
happens, the strategically ﬂexible economy repositions and regroups, investing more
in existing competencies or sourcing new ones in pursuit of an optimal portfolio for
the new conjuncture. As denoted by the Caribbean expression: ‘‘If you lose the dog,
grab the cat’’.14 Back to our Gala´pagos ﬁnch: just like a ﬁnch, the basic beak
physiognomy remains unchanged: the same goes for the small island economy’s key
Figure 2. Spinning the wheel: the structures of small economies.
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enduring characteristics. But, unlike the ﬁnch, and even better than the Aesopian
frog, small, often island economies have the added capacity to refashion their beaks
in response to actual or potential environmental opportunity.
This is not to say that all small economies are successful. Haiti in the Caribbean,
and the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Timor Leste in the Paciﬁc, represent islands
or quasi-islands where the rule of law has collapsed in recent years, or where
economies have been prone to gross mismanagement—they now have the unenviable
status of being referred to as ‘failed states’.15 The sovereign state of Nauru, in
particular, once a phosphate nugget hailed as the richest per capita country in the
world, has been acting much like a ﬁef of Australia (e.g. Connell, 2006). But, as has
been argued earlier, the general global picture for small (mainly island) states is
positive. That for non-sovereign (mainly island) jurisdictions is even better.
This article is a (long overdue) response to the vulnerability literature, and is very
much an actor-driven assessment of small economies and their citizens, presenting
them as strategically securing their place in the world. They do so by making choices,
even as those choices are curtailed or reduced because of history, geography,
resource restrictions and happenstance. Our approach will hopefully bring in some
fresh air to a debate that has been dominated far too long by structural determinism,
wherein smallness, islandness and remoteness only feature as handicaps that
somehow need to be overcome or compensated for. We have put forward a strategic
ﬂexibility model, both as counterpoint to the vulnerability one, and as an alternative
and coherent theoretical model for the study of small, often island, economies.
To conclude, it appears useful to pitch in another quote, this time from the
unlikely source of Karl Marx, one that positions human agency within historical
realism:
Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. (Marx, 1852, chapter 1, emphasis
added)
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Notes
1. We understand smallness to be essentially an arbitrary term, and we are aware that the world’s current
median sovereign state population is 5.3 million (represented by Finland). We also note that the
Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) has adopted a working deﬁnition of small states to comprise
those with resident populations of less than 1.5 million. However, recent ComSec literature
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(e.g. Qureshi and te Velde 2008; ComSec 2006) seems willing to adopt an upper threshold of ﬁve
million population (thus including Singapore).
2. Though not included by Katzenstein, Ireland (1987–2005), with its own experience of corporatism
(e.g. Walsh, 2004, pp. 279 et seq.), would ﬁt comfortably within this list. There are, however, other
explanations for the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomenon.
3. Were ﬁnches as supple and ﬂexible as small states, the birds would be able to change the shape and size
of their beak practically at will, something that evolution does not (yet?) allow to happen.
4. New Zealand is nevertheless a major exporter of pastoral commodities, whose processing and
transportation accounts for a larger share of GDP.
5. Again, New Zealand is to some extent the exception that proves this rule: an economy whose rural
hinterland has always been highly developed, technologically sophisticated, and globalized in outlook.
Even there, farmers have generally been a conservative political voice, but their inﬂuence has waned
since the 1950s.
6. Full dataset available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.
XLS.
7. Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters, 1985).
8. These are: Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Tokelau and Tuvalu.
9. Aruba, Cayman Islands, Sint Maarten and the UK Virgin Islands have the highest tourism
penetration index scores (based on 2003 data). McElroy (2006, p. 72, Table 6).
10. Personal considerations aﬀecting citizenship, residence and employment rights; Resource Manage-
ment; Overseas engagement and ultra-national recognition; FInance and Transportation.
11. The two other ‘signatures’ identiﬁed by Warrington and Milne (2007) are the civilization and the
refuge.
12. Witness, for example, the ‘water wars’ between Singapore and Malaysia (Sparke et al., 2004).
13. For an early study of this phenomenon, see King and Strachan (1980) on Gozo.
14. In St Lucian Creole: Mantche shien, pwen shat (see Carnegie, 1982, p. 11).
15. A Failed States Index was initiated in 2004. See: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
story_id¼3098. The current global recession may herald another category of ﬁscally failed states,
starting with Iceland.
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